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ABSTRACT
Taobao, as the largest online retail platform in the world, provides
billions of online display advertising impressions formillions of ad-
vertisers every day. For commercial purposes, the advertisers bid
for specific spots and target crowds to compete for business traf-
fic. The platform chooses the most suitable ads to display in tens
of milliseconds. Common pricing methods include cost per mille
(CPM) and cost per click (CPC). Traditional advertising systems
target certain traits of users and ad placements with fixed bids,
essentially regarded as coarse-grained matching of bid and traffic
quality. However, the fixed bids set by the advertisers competing
for different quality requests cannot fully optimize the advertisers’
key requirements. Moreover, the platform has to be responsible
for the business revenue and user experience. Thus, we proposed
a bid optimizing strategy called optimized cost per click (OCPC)
which automatically adjusts the bid to achieve finer matching of
bid and traffic quality of page view (PV) request granularity. Our
approach optimizes advertisers’ demands, platform business rev-
enue and user experience and as a whole improves traffic alloca-
tion efficiency. We have validated our approach in Taobao display
advertising system in production. The online A/B test shows our
algorithm yields substantially better results than previous fixed bid
manner.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Computational advertising; Dis-
play advertising;
KEYWORDS
Display Advertising, Bid Optimization, Probability Estimation
1 INTRODUCTION
Advertising fosters the rise of new brands and keeps existing qual-
ity brands youth forever. Online advertising [6, 9, 13, 14], a market-
ing strategy involving the use of the internet as a medium to obtain
website traffic and target, and deliver marketing messages to the
right customers, has experienced an exponential increase in the
growth since the early 1990s. Real-time bidding (RTB) [15, 16, 22]
technology in online advertising allows advertisers to bid for ev-
ery individual impression. And lots of research [23–26] has found
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Figure 1: Banner and itemCPC ads displayed on Taobao mo-
bile app home.
effective and efficient bidding strategies tomaximize unilateral eco-
nomic surplus of a party, such as advertisers, consumers and inter-
mediary platforms.
More than RTB systems, Taobao, called “the country’s biggest
online marketplace” by the Economist [1], established one of the
most advanced online advertising system in the world. In both
mobile app and PC website of Taobao, selected ads are presented
to users in specific spots. In this paper, we focus on the bid opti-
mization problem of the indispensable CPC display advertising in
Taobao mobile app. Two ad formats involved are as follows:
• Banner CPC Ads: The ads appear in the top banner of Taobao
home page as Figure 1. Advertisers set up campaigns for a
single item, a store or a brand.
• Item CPC Ads: Single items are displayed to users in the
Guess What You Like column including about two hundred
spots, three of which are for advertising and the others are
for recommendation as Figure 1.
Connecting users and advertisers, Taobao advertising platform
forms its own unique ecosystem characterized by:
• First, unlike most RTB systems, for which it’s difficult to
obtain complete user data, Taobao itself acts as demand side
and supply side at the same time. This ecologically closed-
loop system enables Taobao to collect integrated user data
and ad campaigns’ information.
• Second,most advertisers in the system are small andmedium-
sized ones who are more concerned about the increase in
revenue than promoting their brands. Therefore the increase
in grossmerchandise volume (GMV) can better benefit these
advertisers.
• Third, while different advertisers could pursue different key
performance indicators (KPI, e.g., impressions, clicks, con-
versions or return of investment (ROI)), they bid for clicks
on Taobao platform, i.e., CPC is adopted. We will discuss
other methods such as cost per mille (CPM) and cost per
sale (CPS) later.
• The last but the most important is that advertising spots
must meet the media requirements, which is measured by
indices such as click-through rate (CTR), conversion rate
(CVR), GMV, etc. Here is an example of GMV analysis. First,
we hope that the introduction of business traffic does not
unduly affect user experience. Thus, setting GMV require-
ments achieves a win-win situation of business revenue and
user experience. Second, as Taobao’s advertisers are precisely
Taobao’s sellers, with sellers using an approximately fixed
percentage (taking rate) of revenue for marketing purposes,
raising GMV will result in advertisers increasing their ad-
vertising budgets, which brings long-term benefits to the
platform.
Weighing the pros and cons, we adopt CPC in the two ad for-
mats. Although advertisers assume less risk with CPS [2, 5, 21],
compared to CPC, CPS ignores the value of clicks, providing worse
traffic liquidating efficiency. Since the involved ad formats aremainly
for small and medium-sized advertisers, CPM poses higher risk
while CPC allows advertisers to control the cost of clicks and the
platform takes the risk of turning page views to clicks.With Taobao’s
complete data ecology, standardized e-commerce advertising and
interactive process, CPC is sufficiently effective.
Many state-of-the-art systems such as Facebook’s [7] use differ-
ent designs from Taobao. To some large social networking services
(SNSs), for example, through optimized cost per mille (oCPM), ad-
vertisers can bid for click and actually pay per impression [7]. SNS
advertising interactions are usually divergent, such as like, click,
share, etc., while Taobao’s transactions are often accomplished by
simple serial clicks. From the data ecology point of view, after ad
clicks, Taobao users’ all behaviors are still on Taobao platform,
which provides conditions for follow-up interaction-based deduc-
tions. However, the SNS usually lets advertisers bid for clicks or
other actions and then converts to equivalent CPM manner, which
in mechanism encourages advertiser to upload real follow-up in-
teraction data and further optimizes the bid.
In previously mentioned two ad formats, taking into account
the ecology, efficiency, etc., we choose CPC method which is the
focus of this paper.
Taobao’s advertising system includes filtering millions of ads
and ranking of these candidate ads. First, mining user preference
inferred from its behavior data and the ad item’s details, Taobao tar-
geting system [17, 18] trains models to filter mass amount of ads
for each page view (PV) request, which is called matching stage.
Different from the recommendation [20] not involving advertisers,
the matching service recalling related users has to reflect the ad-
vertisers’ bidding will and ensuring market depth. Secondly, real-
time prediction (RTP) engine predicts click-through rate (pCTR)
for each eligible ad. Thirdly, traditionally, these candidate ads are
ranked by bid ∗pctr and displayed based on the order to maximize
effective cost per mille (eCPM sorting mechanism).
Advertisers always expect the bid to match the traffic quality.
Due to technical limitations, traditional methods can only set fixed
bids for specific user groups and ad slots for coarse-grained traffic
differentiation, however, advertisers are looking for further fine-
grainedmatching of bids and traffic quality. Ranking process based
on the fixed bids has two defects. On the one hand, it is inefficient
that a fixed bid set by an advertiser deals with continuous inter-
net traffic of different commercial qualities; on the other hand, tra-
ditional methods maximize eCPM to pursue short-term commer-
cial revenue, however, can not optimize and control media require-
ments such as GMV, detrimental to Taobao’s long-term interests.
For these two issues, from the perspective of advertisers, oCPM
in some SNSs [7] converted equivalently from other bidding ob-
jectives, is able to maximize advertisers’ interests, however, may
not guarantee the platform ecological health such as GMV; from
another aspect, excessive pursuit of media requirements like GMV
bymodifying the ranking formulabid ∗pctr can not bring effective
commercial benefits to advertisers and the platform.
In order to solve above problems, we propose optimized cost per
click (OCPC) with following characteristics: for each PV request,
on the premise of optimizing the advertiser’s demands, OCPC ad-
justs the bid toward the true value of the traffic quality, and mean-
while maximizes a composite score reflecting overall ecology of
user experience, advertisers’ interests, and platform’s revenue, by
keeping eCPM sorting mechanism unchanged; our design allows
us to adapt the OCPC system flexibly with lower costs based on the
changing needs of the business. We expect through optimizing the
traffic matching efficiency, our OCPC achieves a comprehensive
upgrade of all the user, advertiser and platform indices. It’s worth
mentioning that enhanced cost per click [10] (ECPC) in Google
AdWords also attempts to adjust the bid according to the poten-
tial conversion rate. However, besides conversion rate, platform
indices like GMV, which are crucial elements for Taobao platform,
cannot be optimized directly in ECPC manner.
Our major contributions are summarized below. (i) We illumi-
nate some characteristics of Taobao display advertising system and
its subsystems. (ii) We propose a novel bid optimization approach
which achieves the overall optimization of advertisers’ interests,
user experience and platform revenue of Taobao ecology. (iii) Com-
prehensive offline and online experiments are conducted to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed OCPC mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a
brief introduction to Taobao advertising system. Section 3 presents
the OCPC details. Section 4 introduces the prediction process. At
last, Section 5 focuses on the experimental results about the pro-
posed approach, including model effectiveness estimation, offline
experimental mechanism, and online A/B test performance.
2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section describes how data and information flow in Taobao’s
display ads system as Figure 2, which is essential to help under-
stand why and how bid optimization works. Each system compo-
nent and the sequence of events handled in them from the fore-
most page view request to the ultimate impression are highlighted
as follow:
Front
PV Request Results
Merger
Matching
(User, Ads) 
Matching
Search
Match
Select
StrategyPredict
RTP
(User, Ad)
Prediction
SN
(User, Ads)
Searching
DN
Creatives
Selection
Ele-Select
SCS
Elements
Selection
OCPC
Calibration
Bounding
Ranking
Figure 2: The star schema of Taobao display advertising sys-
tem and the proposed bid optimization strategy used in it.
Front Server receives a page view request from a user and
hand out toMerger Server which acting as a central coordinator
communicates with other components during the whole process.
Merger Server requestsMatching Server to analyze the user and
get a list of feature tags according to the advertisers’ user target-
ing requirements. Through Merger Server, these tags are delivered
to Search Node (SN) Server for searching particular candidate
ads along with the bids. In aforementioned Guess What You Like,
the number of candidates is reduced from thousands to about four
hundreds. Then,Real-timePrediction (RTP) Serverpredicts the
click-through rate (pCTR) and conversion rate (pCVR) for the can-
didates from SN. In terms of CTR prediction [3, 11, 12], we use mix-
ture of logistic regression (MLR, which is also called as LS-PLM
[8]) model to deal with particular high dimensional, i.e., usually
hundreds of millions of dimensions, sparse and binarized features.
As a part of merger, Strategy Layer contains the main logic of
OCPC which optimizes traffic allocation by ranking stage based
on pCTR, pCVR and bid. The strategy layer is also responsible for
the follow-up ads duplication removal, and final impression price
calculation under generalized second-price auction (GSP). Accord-
ing to the rank of ads, titles and image addresses are extracted by
Data Node (DN) Server, which are further optimized by Smart
Creative Service (SCS). At last, the front server returns ad results
to the mobile app or PC website. And the subsequent click or con-
version will be recorded in the log system. All subsystems together
constitute a complete data ecology based on which we introduce
OCPC strategy in the next section.
3 OPTIMIZED COST PER CLICK
In this part, we first mathematically describe the demands of ad-
vertisers and conditions for optimization. Secondly, we propose an
algorithm to optimize the platform ecology index and platform rev-
enue. At last, relevant details are introduced. Practically, our algo-
rithm framework applies to a wide range of advertisers’ demands
and platform ecology indices, such as number of page views, clicks,
conversions, etc. As a typical case, this paper sets ROI and gain-
ing quality traffic as the advertisers’ demand, and GMV as the
platform ecology index, which along with platform revenue are
optimized by adjusting the advertisers’ bids. SupposeA is the set of
ad campaigns that are eligible for a PV request. With this specific
PV request, for each campaign a ∈ A, there exists a preseted cor-
responding bid ba by the advertiser. For each ba , the role of OCPC
algorithm is to adjust it and find an optimized b∗a to achieve the
pre-designated various optimization requirements.
3.1 Optimization Scope
ROI Constraint. Taking into account the small and medium-
sized advertisers being more concerned about themarketing effect,
we choose to optimize their revenue (GMV) while keeping or im-
proving ROI as a primary application of our algorithm. Here we
introduce relevant notations and finally derive the mathematical
representation of ROI.
First, we define the probability of transaction conversion c con-
ditioned on a user u and a clicked ad a as p(c |u,a). For a specific
item, note that in p(c |u,a) the ad spot is not considered as a con-
dition for different spots eventually leading to the same item page.
For a particular ad campaign a, define va as the predicted pay-per-
buy (PPB) by consumers, i.e., the seller’s revenue. Thus, the ex-
pected GMV for a single click is p(c |u,a) ∗va .
Although the actual cost is calculated according to GSP mecha-
nism, here we suppose the cost of a click paid by the advertiser is
ba . So the expected ROI for a single click is derived as Eq.1.
roi(u,a) =
p(c |u,a) ∗va
ba
(1)
Further, the overall ROI of ad a across different users and clicks
is derived as Eq.2, where nu is the total number of clicks for a user
over a period of time. (We suppose the ROI is for a particular crowd
and a spot, thus ba is consistent.)
roia =
va ·
∑
u nu · p(c |u,a)
ba ·
∑
u nu
=
Eu [p(c |u,a)] · va
ba
(2)
Equation 2 indicates that the advertiser’s overall ROI is deter-
mined by three factors: the expectation of conversion rateEu [p(c |u,a)],
the predicted va and bid ba , among which va is inherent for each
ad, and Eu [p(c |u,a)] is regarded as stationary in each particular
auction.
In practice, the current predictionmodel is used to predict pCVRs
of competing ads from past few days and the largest, smallest 10%
of these CVRs are eliminated, with average of the remaining com-
posing current Eu [p(c |u,a)]. The goal of bid optimization re-
quires that roia should keep unchanged or be improved (so
called ROI constraint), and advertisers can gain more high
quality traffic.
Bid Optimization Boundary. Equation 2 proves the linear re-
lationship between roia and Eu [p(c |u,a)], i.e., bid optimization that
satisfying
b∗a
ba
≤
p(c |u,a)
Eu [p(c |u,a)]
will prevent ROI from falling. Along
with considering advertisers’ demands of gain quality traffics, we
conduct the following bid optimization principles: raise the bid un-
der ROI constraint to help advertisers compete for quality traffics
(
p(c |u,a)
Eu [p(c |u,a)]
≥ 1), and depress the bid to save cost for those low
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a
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Figure 3: The bid optimization scope (the gray area) under
ROI constraint.
quality traffics (
p(c |u,a)
Eu [p(c |u,a)]
< 1). The bid optimization range that
compromised quality and quantity is illustrated in the gray area of
Figure 3, based on the ratio of p(c |u,a) and Eu [p(c |u,a)]. Note that
there exists a fixed threshold ra (e.g., 40%), for the sake of safety
and business settings. The lower bound is essential to avoid the sit-
uation that some advertisers may get little traffic when optimizing
their ROI.
With the area depicted in Figure 3, the lower and upper bounds,
denoted as l(b∗a) and u(b
∗
a), of bid optimization for an ad campaign
a are as Eq. 3 and 4. It’s worth to emphasize that the bid optimiza-
tion boundaries can be generalized to refer to other pursuits of ad-
vertisers, not limited to ROI. If bid optimization is not authorized
by some advertisers, the corresponding lower and upper bounds
both equal to ba .
l (b∗a ) =


ba · (1 − ra ),
p(c |u, a)
Eu [p(c |u, a)]
< 1
ba ,
p(c |u, a)
Eu [p(c |u, a)]
≥ 1
(3)
u(b∗a ) =


ba ,
p(c |u, a)
Eu [p(c |u, a)]
< 1
ba ·min(1 + ra ,
p(c |u, a)
Eu [p(c |u, a)]
),
p(c |u, a)
Eu [p(c |u, a)]
≥ 1
(4)
3.2 Ranking
Optimizing bid price in the given boundary can help advertisers
gain better quality traffics and higher ROI. However, different bid
priceb∗a chosen from the feasible region might result in different ad
ranks under eCPM sorting mechanism (i.e., ads are still ranked by
pctr ∗bid after bid optimization), and consequently bring different
revenues or other indicators. In the following content of this sec-
tion, we’ll introduce our novel way to choose b∗a from the feasible
region, which can attain best composite index that has taken pur-
suits from all sides into account, on the premise of holding eCPM
sorting mechanism.
Assuming that we’re going to display one ad under eCPM sort-
ing mechanism, we expect the ad to maximize the following objec-
tive
max
b∗1, · · · ,b
∗
n
f (b∗k ) (5)
s .t . k = argmax
i
pctri ∗ b
∗
i (6)
l(b∗i ) ≤ b
∗
i ≤ u(b
∗
i ), i = 1, · · · ,n (7)
where n is the number of eligible ads in a PV, i.e., ‖A‖, and f (·) is
the function that can give a composite index which has included
pursuits from all sides. Without loss of generality, we assume that
f (b∗i ) is monotone increasing w.r.t. b
∗
i . Condition in Eq. 6 means
that the auction-winning ad is the top ranked kth ad under eCPM
sorting, and the above optimization problem is to maximize f (b∗
k
)
of the auction-winning ad. Condition in Eq. 7 ensures the opti-
mized bid price in the determined scope. There are two meanings
for the optimization problem presented in Eq. 5. On the one hand,
we attempt to select the kth ad that could have the largest f (b∗
k
)
value; on the other hand, the bid price of each ad i ∈ A should be
adjusted to make sure that the selected kth ad can have the largest
eCPM. For f (·), we give the following two examples
f1(b
∗
k
) = pctrk ∗ pcvrk ∗vk ,
f2(b
∗
k
) = pctrk ∗ pcvrk ∗vk + α ∗ pctrk ∗ b
∗
k
where f1(·) tends to prompt Taobao platform’s overall GMV, which
is the revenue of all advertisers. And f2(·) is a compromise of Taobao’s
GMV and advertising revenue. Note that α is the trade off coeffi-
cient between GMV and advertising revenue, and different α value
could result in different goal of bid optimization, just in the way
presented in Eq. 5.
The remaining work of ranking is to find b∗a for each a that can
maximize the objective in Eq. 5. Analogy to the boundary of opti-
mized bid price, we derive the boundary of pctra ∗ b
∗
a as l(s
∗
a) and
u(s∗a), called the lower and upper bound of optimized rank score s
∗
a
(l(s∗a) = pctra ∗ l(b
∗
a), u(s
∗
a) = pctra ∗u(b
∗
a), according to Eq. 3 and
4). To optimize Objective 5, we just need to sort ads in descending
order of f (u(b∗i )) (note that we use bid’s upper bound u(b
∗
i ) here
because we assume f (b∗i ) is monotone increasing w.r.t.b
∗
i ) for each
i ∈ A, then choose the first ad k whoseu(s∗
k
) is no less than all other
ads’ l(s∗i ) (to make sure that Constraints 6 and 7 can be satisfied)
as the result to display and set b∗
k
= u(b∗
k
). Last, update bid prices
for other candidates in their feasible region, which ensure ad k has
the largest eCPM.
Returning to the real scenario that theremight bemore than one
(e.g., N ) ads displayed in each PV, we propose a greedy algorithm
in Algorithm 1 and give a brief explanation as follow.
First, we sort ads according to f (·) (line 3) and pick an ad out
(derive the ad ask , lines 4-5) by optimizing the objective function in
Eq. 5. Then, we update remaining ads’u(s∗i ) by limiting them to no
more than u(s∗
k
) (correspondingly updateu(b∗i ) to ensure that ad k
could have the largest eCPM after bid optimization, as Constraint
6, lines 8-11). Afterwards, we repeat the above two steps until all
N ads are picked out (lines 2-12). Last, set b∗i of all ads to their
bid price upper bound u(b∗i ) (lines 13-15). The time complexity of
the proposed ranking algorithm isO(N ∗ ‖A‖ ∗ log ‖A‖). Typically,
N is a small number (e.g., N = 3 in Item CPC Ads) that real-time
response won’t be an issue.
Example 3.1. Here we give an example to help understand the
ranking algorithm. Suppose that there are 4 eligible ads in A given
in Table 1, and the number of ads to display is N = 2. Now, we
are going to select 2 ads from Ad 1-4 in Table 1. According to the
proposed ranking algorithm, these 4 ads are sorted in descending
order of f2(u(b
∗)). The largest rank score lower bound is l(s∗3) =
0.09 (marked in blue in Table 1). And the top ranked ad’s u(s∗1) =
0.112 (also marked in blue), which is larger than 0.09. Thus, Ad
1 is picked out from A and inserted into the winning set A, and
the candidate set A is updated to Table 2, according to lines 6-11
in Algorithm 1 (updated cells are in red). Afterwards, Ad 3 rather
than Ad 2 is selected as another winning ad in the second cycle,
because Ad 2’s rank score upper bound u(s∗2) = 0.075, which is
smaller than 0.09. Then, the loop ends because ‖A‖ == N . Finally,
the bid optimization result of each ad is given in Table 3.
Ad # pctr bid u(b∗) u(s∗) 10−2 l(s∗) 10−2 f2(u(b
∗))
1 0.04 2 2.8 11.2 8 0.312
2 0.05 1.5 1.5 7.5 4.5 0.255
3 0.06 1.5 1.95 11.7 9 0.237
4 0.04 1 1 4 3.6 0.14
Table 1: 4 eligible ads in A and their pCTRs, bids, etc., and α
in f2(·) is set to 1. The upper bound of each ad’s rank score
u(s∗) = pctr ∗ u(b∗), and the lower bound of each ad’s rank
score l(s∗) = pctr ∗ l(b∗).
Ad # pctr bid u(b∗) u(s∗) 10−2 l(s∗) 10−2 f2(u(b
∗))
2 0.05 1.5 1.5 7.5 4.5 0.255
3 0.06 1.5 1.86 11.2 9 0.232
4 0.04 1 1 4 3.6 0.14
Table 2: Remained 3 ads and their updates in A after Ad 1 is
picked out. Updated cells are in red.
Ad # pctr bid b∗ f2(u(b
∗)) eCPM
1 0.04 2 2.8 0.312 0.112
3 0.06 1.5 1.86 0.232 0.112
2 0.05 1.5 1.5 0.255 0.075
4 0.04 1 1 0.14 0.04
Table 3: Bid optimizatoin result of each eligible ad.
By such ranking strategy, we decouple the final sorting index
and the goal of advertising traffic. On the one hand, ads can still
be sorted by pctr ∗ bid , which is the way to maximize eCPM; on
the other hand, the advertising platform can choose ads accord-
ing to other pursuits by different f (·). Another concerned problem
is about budget constraint of advertisers. Once an ad campaign
spends out its budget, it will be excluded from the following auc-
tions, which would not affect the bid optimization process.
3.3 Algorithm Details
After introducing the core ideas in our OCPC mechanism, we’ll
going to detail the whole strategy layer.
Calibration. From the historical experience of maintaining the
advertising system, we find that inherent bias exists on the pre-
dicted values used in OCPC layer, which could affect the algorithm
effectiveness. Since it’s difficult to do adjustment inmodel training,
we do calibration after prediction at the beginning of OCPC layer.
Algorithm 1: Ranking Algorithm
Input: Ad list A, corresponding boundaries of bid price
Output: Optimized bid prices b∗a for ∀a ∈ A
1 Winning set A = ∅;
2 repeat
3 Sort ads in A in descending order of f (u(b∗i ));
4 t ← the largest l(s∗a) for ∀a ∈ A;
5 Find the first ad k from A that u(s∗
k
) ≥ t ;
6 A = A ∪ {k};
7 A = A\{k};
8 for i ∈ A do
9 u(s∗i ) = min(u(s
∗
i ),u(s
∗
k
));
10 u(b∗i ) = min(u(b
∗
i ),
u(s∗
i
)
pctri
);
11 end
12 until ‖A‖ == N or A == ∅;
13 for i ∈ A ∪A do
14 b∗i =
u(s∗
i
)
pctri
;
15 end
16 Return b∗a for each ad in A ∪A;
We’ll take pCVR calibration as the example. The RTP module
usually gives a larger estimated CVR value when the actual CVR
is in a high level. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4. We di-
vide all ads to 20 groups according to their pCVR. The correspond-
ing real CVR and the ratio of predicted and real CVR are draw in
the figure. We can see that the ratio becomes larger in groups with
large pCVR. Thus, We calibrate the predicted CVR as
p(c |u, a) =


p(c |u, a), p(c |u, a) < tc
tc ∗ (1 + log(
p(c |u, a)
tc
)), p(c |u, a) ≥ tc
(8)
where tc is the calibration threshold, typically 0.012 in practice.
Those pCVR values that are larger than tc will be calibrated with
Eq. 8, which is an intuitive way that aims to reduce the gap be-
tween predicted and real CVR for ads with large pCVR values. Af-
ter calibration, we can see from Figure 4 that the gap drops signif-
icantly in high pCVR region.
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Figure 4: The gap between predicted and real CVR w.r.t. dif-
ferent pCVR level before and after calibration (tc = 0.012,
from Jan 10, 2017 to Jan 16, 2017).
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Figure 5: Feature composition of CTR and CVR prediction
model.
Overall OCPC Strategy. In Algorithm 2, we give the overview
of the over OCPC strategy, from calibration to ranking. Lines 1-4
with functions calibrate and calculateBoundary have linear time
complexityO(‖A‖). The time complexity of rank function isO(N ∗
‖A‖ ∗ log ‖A‖). Therefore, the run time performance bottleneck of
OCPC strategy is the ranking stage. Considering the typical value
of ‖A‖ (about hundreds) and N , the real-time performance is not
an issue for the proposed approach.
Algorithm 2: OCPC Algorithm
Input: Eligible ads A, and corresponding predictions
Output: Optimized bid price b∗a for a ∈ A
1 for i ∈ A do
2 calibrate();
3 calculateBoundary();
4 end
5 rank();
6 return each b∗a ;
4 MODEL ESTIMATION
The stated bid optimization boundary of OCPC is extremely depen-
dent on CVR prediction. Meanwhile, other predicted values like
pCTR will also affect the performance of proposed strategy for the
most part. In this section, we are going to focus on the prediction
models, along with the accuracy and stability of predicted values.
4.1 Model and Features
In Taobao estimation, we have features of user and campaignwhich
are sparse and have tens of millions dimensions. Logistic Regres-
sion is a widely used algorithm in tasks like CTR prediction [19].
However, the problem to solve may be non-linear. Therefore, we
use mixture of logistic regression (MLR, which is also called as LS-
PLM [8]) algorithm in RTP server. We do not expand more about
MLR here, instead, we are going to introduce the composition of
feature to help understand how the learning model work.
In Figure 5, we illustrate the feature composition in CTR and
CVR prediction. We’ll give a brief introduction to these three kinds
of features along with their combinations. Context feature is fea-
tures related to the context. For example, spot position feature (we
call it PID feature) is used to distinguish different spots (e.g., spots
in Android or IOS). User feature mainly contains user profile fea-
tures (like gender, age, etc.) and user behavior features (e.g., click
times of different categories in a period of time). Campaign feature
is consists of features like ad ID. Beside separate features in those
three kinds, their combinations (e.g., the Cartesian Product of nick
name and ad ID) are also used. Furthermore, In CVR prediction,
the results of click quality model (used to qualify a click behavior)
are used as input, which has shown significant improvement in
practice.
In CTR model, positive samples are collected from those clicked
impressions. And the negative samples are those not clicked im-
pressions. In CVR model, positive samples are those clicked and
converted impressions, and the negative samples are those clicked
but not converted impressions. New models are trained every day
to eliminate the variance between different days.
4.2 Model Performance
Serving precise results are very important for prediction models.
In tasks like CTR prediction, AUC is a widely used metric to mea-
sure model effectiveness. However, existing research [4] shows
that better AUC results in testing may bring worse performance
in production. This also confused us in practice when tuning our
prediction model. We analyzed the problem and found that AUC
metric doesn’t treat different users and spots differently. For ex-
ample, users who never click any ad or obscure ad spots would
bring turbulence to AUC result towards a lower value. According
to those facts and analysis, we proposed an AUC like metric, called
Group AUC (GAUC) in Eq. 9. First, we aggregate all test data ac-
cording to the user (u) and the particular position (p) of ad spot.
Then, the AUC results are calculated in each single group (note
that if there are all positive or negative samples in a group, we re-
move the group from the data). At last, we average these weighted
AUC (weight w(u,p) is proportional to impression times or click
times in the group) results in different groups and take the result
as the GAUC value.
GAUC =
∑
(u,p)w(u,p) ∗AUC(u,p)∑
(u,p)w(u,p)
(9)
CTR and CVR Model Performance. In Figure 6, we give the
AUC and GAUC performance of CTR and CVR prediction model
in a 7 days period. The results show that the performance of daily
models conducted by MLR algorithm are fairly stable. The CVR
model has higher GAUC than CTR model, because there is less
noises in the samples of CVR model. In Figure 7 and 4, we illus-
trate the ratio of predicted and real CTR, CVR values w.r.t. different
predicted value levels. The results show that the predicted values
of CTR are usually larger than the real ones. However, what mat-
ters more is the ordinal relation between different predicted CTR
values in the proposed OCPC strategy.
The performance results show that the CTR and CVR prediction
models, which are prerequisite of the proposed OCPC mechanism,
are practicable.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Satisfied by the above prediction model performance results, we
are going to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposedOCPCmethod.
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Figure 6: The AUC andGAUCperformance of CTR andCVR
model in a 7 days period (from Jan 10, 2017 to Jan 16, 2017).
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Figure 7: The gap between predicted and real CTR w.r.t. dif-
ferent pCTR level (from Jan 10, 2017 to Jan 16, 2017).
The following experiments have two parts: offline simulation and
online A/B test.
5.1 Offline Simulation
In online advertising, it always take several days, or even several
weeks, for new algorithms to take effect. Such long feedback time
would put off the development and upgrading of new algorithm.
To overcome the problem, we build an offline simulation platform
to accelerate the validation of new ideas. Based on log data, the pre-
view procedures can be restored perfectly. In other words, giving
the same eligible ad list for each PV request, the auction-winning
ads in simulation environment are the same with production en-
vironment. And for the coming post-view user behaviors, we use
the predicted probability as a substitution of real clicks or conver-
sions to estimate the real performance of different bid optimization
strategies. For example, if an impressed ad’s CTR prediction is 4%,
then it will contribute 0.04 to the total times of clicks. In the sim-
ulation, we use 20% of all bidding records (which is about twenty
million PVs) in Item CPC Ads in Feb 11, 2017, and we compared 4
different bid optimization strategies:
• Strategy0 is the old strategy without bid optimization. And
due to the sensibility and privacy of commercial data, the
results of other strategies will be shown in comparison form
contrast to this basic strategy.
• Strategy 1 is a simple bid optimization strategy that takes
the advertisers’ view. Here we directly optimize b∗a = ba ∗
(1+σ (
p(c |u,a)
Eu [p(c |u,a)]
,w)∗ra ), whereσ (x,w) =
xw−1
xw+1 is amono-
tone increasing function (when w > 0) w.r.t. x , ranging in
(−1, 1).
• Strategy 2 is our OCPC strategy that takes GMV pursuit of
the traffic into account. The index f (b∗
k
) = pctrk ∗ b
∗
k
∗ (1+
σ (
pcvrk∗vk∗‖A ‖∑
i∈A pcvri∗vi
,w) ∗ ra),w = 6 and ra = 0.4, where the
implicit term (pcvrk ∗vk ) could take effect to prompt GMV.
• Strategy 3 also attempts to promote GMV, but in the other
way that directly sort eligible ads by descending order of
pctr ∗ pcvr ∗ bid , without bid optimization.
Str 1 is a straightforward strategy like the one proposed in [16],
which attempts to optimize advertisers’ ROI. The relationship be-
tween its bid optimization result and p(c |u,a) is illustrated in Fig-
ure 8. Str 2 is the proposed OCPC strategy that has also considered
Taobao’s GMV pursuit. Using pcvr and v as the arguments of σ (·)
in f (·), Str 2 tends to select those ads with high GMV estimation in-
directly. Str 3 also attempts to promote GMV but in a new sorting
mechanism out of eCPM.
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Figure 8: The curve of σ (·) and the corresponding bid adjust-
ment ratio of Str 1 when ra = 0.4, w.r.t. differentw .
Before giving the results, we will introduce some metrics in de-
tail that we used to evaluate the performance of different bid op-
timization strategies. RPM is the indicator of advertising revenue
per thousand impressions, which could measure the traffic liqui-
dating efficiency of advertising platform. GMV per mille (GPM) is
the gross merchandise volume per thousand impressions, which
is related to advertisers’ revenue and user experience of Taobao.
ROI is to measure advertisers’ return on investment. CTR, CVR
and PPC are the average click-through rate, conversion rate and
pay-per-click respectively.
RPM GPM ROI CTR CVR PPC
Str 1 -9.5% 8.8% 20.2% -0.5% 10.1% -7.8%
Str 2 5.6% 14.1% 8.1% -1.9% 14.9% 9.5%
Str 3 -17.7% 23.6% 50.2% -8.6% 74.0% -9.8%
Table 4: Simulation results of different OCPC strategies
when ra = 0.4.
In Table 4, we give the results of Str 1,2,3 against to Str 0. The pa-
rameterw in adjustment functionσ (·) is chosen by cross-validation
and set to 2 and 6 for Str 1 and 2 respectively. Str 1 focuses on op-
timizing advertisers’ ROI and cannot ensure better RPM. Str 3 can
boost GPM by ranking with pctr ∗pcvr ∗bid , however, it also pulls
down RPM (because of pay per click (PPC) and CTR drop). Only
the proposed OCPC strategy in Str 2 can achieve a tripartite win-
win situation of GPM, ROI and RPM.
To measure the influence of different adjustment ranges ra , we
conduct an experiment with Str 2 (which outperforms the other
strategies in the above experiment) and the results are shown in
Table 5. Offline simulation results indicate that larger ra can bring
better performance. And the increment of RPM is less than that of
GPM, which results in a higher ROI lift when the adjustment range
is large.
The results in Table 4 and 5 show that Strategy 2 positively
works in boosting overall GMV, and ROI constraint can protect
advertisers’ interests.
ra RPM GPM ROI CTR CVR PPC
0.2 4.2% 6.5% 2.2% -0.5% 6.5% 5.5%
0.3 5.2% 10.2% 4.8% -1.1% 10.4% 7.6%
0.4 5.6% 14.1% 8.1% -1.9% 14.9% 8.1%
0.5 5.5% 18.1% 11.9% -3.1% 19.9% 11.2%
Table 5: Simulation results of Str 2 w.r.t. different ra .
Campaign Results. Besides the overall performance, we also
simulate the performance of particular campaigns under Str 2, to
ensure that the proposed strategy can improve each single cam-
paign’s advertising effect. The results of 10 campaigns with largest
cost in simulation are shown in Table 6. The metric named "Cost"
is the total payment for advertising. An interesting observation is
that seven campaigns’ GPM increases while their PV drops at the
same time, which means that they win less poor quality opportu-
nities with OCPC mechanism. In addition, eight in ten campaigns’
ROI is improved, which shows that the ROI constraint truly work
for separate campaigns. The ROIs of campaign 3 and 8 drop slightly,
because they compete more PVs.
GMV Cost PV GPM ROI
Camp 1 -0.9% -17.5% -16.2% 18.2% 20.1%
Camp 2 -7.7% -27.9% -26.8% 26.2% 28.1%
Camp 3 2.5% 9.2% 2.6% -0.1% -6.2%
Camp 4 23.0% 9.2% 0.4% 22.6% 12.7%
Camp 5 -13.1% -23.8% -22.0% 11.4% 14.0%
Camp 6 0.0% -4.0% -10.3% 11.5% 4.1%
Camp 7 -5.0% -8.0% -9.7% 5.2% 3.2%
Camp 8 64.6% 65.7% 49.5% 10.1% -0.6%
Camp 9 -19.2% -30.4% -28.5% 13.1% 16.1%
Camp 10 -4.2% -5.3% -8.6% 4.9% 1.2%
Table 6: Simulation results of Str 2w.r.t. different campaigns.
5.2 Online Results of OCPC Strategy 2
After offline simulation and online mini flow A/B test in experi-
mental environment, we finally decide to deploy aforementioned
Str 2 in production. Meanwhile, Str 0 is reserved as a contrast test.
In this section, we are going to study the online performance of
proposed OCPC strategy in Item CPC Ads. And other results of dif-
ferent traffic pursuits and scenarios are also shown to prove the
effectiveness and generality of OCPC mechanism.
In Table 7, we give the experimental results of Str 2 with 30%
of whole production traffic, and the benchmark Str 0 also has 30%
traffic. Users are allocated to each strategy randomly, while all ad
campaigns exist in both strategies. Note that we have about ninety
million PVs every day in Item CPC Ads. The results prove stable
improvement of the proposed bid optimization strategy. Advertis-
ers’ interests (indicated by ROI), platform’s revenue (indicated by
RPM) and overall GPM achieve a tripartite win-win situation.
RPM GPM ROI CTR CVR
% Improved 6.6% 8.9% 2.1% -1.3% 5.2%
Table 7: Online experimental results of Str 2 under 30% of
whole production traffic (ra = 0.4, from Aug 23, 2016 to Aug
29, 2016).
After giving the results about overall performance, we do other
experiments (from Sep 8, 2016 to Sep 14, 2016) to verify the effec-
tiveness of the Str 2 further, to find out whether it benefit to most
separate advertisers and the advertising platform in the long term.
Performance inAdvertisers’ View. Firstly, we analyze the per-
formance for each separate campaign. Campaigns with at least 5
conversions in a week are included. In Table 8, we give the propor-
tion data of ad campaigns whose ad performance is improved. In
all campaigns with more than 5 conversions in a week, 67% cam-
paigns get GPM and ROI improvement at the same time. And 24%
campaigns are in the so called quantity and quality exchange
situation: their PV increment is larger than the ROI drop. We say
that it’s also acceptable for some advertisers, because PV incre-
ment might lead those secondary impressions to a campaign and
lower the ROI. However, more impressions could also bring more
conversions.
% Campaigns
GPM and ROI are improved 67%
Quantity and quality exchange 24%
Table 8: The proportion of ad campaigns whose perfor-
mance is improved. Here we choose campaigns with more
than 5 conversions in the experiment.
With OCPC mechanism, advertisers might also be concerned
about what the optimized bid prices actually are. In Figure 9, we
illustrate the numerical relation between optimized bid price b∗a
and determined bid ba for those displayed ads in Feb 19, 2017. We
divide those bidding records into 9 groups, according to their value
of b∗a/ba (ranging from 1 − ra to 1 + ra ). From the results, we can
see that more than half impressions belong to group 5, the mid-
dle group which includes records with b∗a = ba . It’s a reasonable
observation, because the bid optimization upper bound for those
low quality traffics is set to ba according to Eq. 4, and the proposed
ranking algorithm prefer to adopt the upper bound.
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Figure 10: The variation of PV proportion of top 20 cate-
gories (ranked by category’s total advertising cost).
Performance in Platform’s View. Standing by the platform
side, merely focusing on the overall RPM, GPM and ROI results is
far from enough. In Taobao advertising system, ad items are from
variant kinds of categories, e.g., women’s dress, furniture or digital
product. For each category, it has an inherent CVR or ROI level.
There exists the probability that the overall improvements of GMV
or ROI come from the traffic shifting between different categories,
which is not good in the long run. Thus, we give an experimental
result to capture the traffic shifting.
The results of variation of PV proportion are given in Figure
10. PV proportion of a category is the ratio of the category’s PV
and the total PV in an experiment bucket. The results suggest that
the traffic shifting is not too obvious, with all the variations are
within ±10% (note that the PV proportion might change whether
the algorithms are different, in different buckets).
Analogy to the advertisers’ view, we also do experiments to
show the performance in categories’ view. Results in Table 9 sug-
gest that 17% categories (with 62% PVs) get GPM and ROI improve-
ment at the same time.
The results in platform’s and advertisers’ view prove that the
OCPC algorithm has the capability to hand out suitable opportuni-
ties to different ads, which can improve comprehensive utilization
effect of advertising traffic. And all the above results prove that
OCPC takes significant effect for both Taobao advertising platform
and the advertisers.
5.3 Online Performance in Other Scenarios
As mentioned in Section 3.1, advertisers could have different pur-
suits. Before Double Eleven, Taobao sellers are more concerning
about the quantity of goods added to users’ shopping cart. We do
experiments with Str 2 using different f (·) before 2016’s Double
Eleven event. Using the predicted probability of adding to shop-
ping cart (predicted ASR), the index function f (k,b∗
k
) = pctrk ∗
b∗
k
∗ (1 + σ (
pasrk∗‖A ‖∑
i∈A pasrk
,w) ∗ ra ),w = 6 and ra = 0.4.
In Table 10, we give the results of OCPC strategy which helps
prompt ASR. From the results, we can observe that ASR has been
improved 15.6% (compared to Str 2 with aforementioned f (·) in
Section 5.1).
Besides, we give the results of Str 2 in Banner CPC Ads, with
f (k,b∗
k
) = pctrk ∗ bk ∗ (1 + σ (
pcvrk∗‖A ‖∑
i∈A pcvri
,w) ∗ ra ) instead, w = 6
and ra = 0.4, in Table 11. Note that we remove va term from f (·),
because there are store campaigns in which PPBs of different items
vary a lot. The results suggest large CVR and GPM improvement.
Above experiments show that the OCPC mechanism could act
like a general framework to handle different problems, no matter
what the pursuits and scenarios are.
6 CONCLUSION
We introduce a number of important features of Taobao display
advertising system, and elaborate on two key ad formats, i.e., ban-
ner and item ads. By analyzing the ecological characteristics and
comparing with other methods, we use the most suitable pricing
method, i.e., CPC in the involved ads formats.We showcase our sys-
tem architecture and ads serving process, based on which we ana-
lyzed the shortcomings of the traditional CPCmethod and propose
% Category % PV
GPM and ROI are improved 17% 62%
GPM is improved 27% 21%
Quantity and quality exchange 30% 12%
Table 9: The proportion of categories whose performance
is improved, and the corresponding PV proportion of cate-
gories.
GPM RPM CTR CVR ASR
% Improved 0.3% -6.1% -2.9% 21.1% 15.6%
Table 10: The online results about prompting the probability
of adding to shopping cart (fromOct 30, 2016 to Nov 10, 2016,
5% production flow).
GPM RPM ROI CTR CVR
% Improved 15.7% 3.6% 11.7% -0.6% 19%
Table 11: The online results in BannerAds (from Jan 13, 2017
to Jan 15, 2017, 30% production flow).
OCPC algorithm to reconcile the demands of advertisers, platform
ecological indices and platform revenue. We characterize the op-
timization objectives mathematically and give detailed algorithms
with other relative technical details such as predictionmodels, cali-
bration, and algorithm complexity analysis. Holding eCPM sorting
mechanism, our proposed OCPC strategy benefits to not only ad-
vertisers, but also other indices including eCPM itself, by bid opti-
mization. In Taobao display advertising platform, OCPC has been
automatic applied in the whole mobile production traffic of Item
CPC Ads, and can also be chosen to apply by advertisers in their
own Banner CPC Ads traffic.
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